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LEX LOCI DELICTI AND BABCOCK v. JACKSON
R. H ~v'y CHAPPELL*
The commonly accepted choice of law rule, followed consistently
until recently, is that the substantive rights and liabilities arising from a
tort are determined by the law of the place of the tort, lex loci delicti.1
This is embodied in the original Restatement of The Law of the Con-
flict of Laws, § 384:
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN CAUSE OF AcTION
(1) If a cause of action in tort is created at the place of wrong,
a cause of action will be recognized in other states.
(2) If no cause of action is created at the place of wrong, no re-
covery in tort can be had in any other state 2
Lex loci delicti is based upon the vested rights doctrine which postu-
lates that a right to recover for a foreign tort owes its creation to the
law of the jurisdiction where the injury occurred and depends for its
existence and extent solely on such law. This doctrine has been sub-
jected to criticism from time to time as being too inflexible and as not
taking into account underlying policy considerations.3 Professor Willis
L. M. Reese, Reporter for Restatement Second, has observed:
... Work on the original Restatement was commenced in 1923. At
this time the teachings of Professor Joseph H. Beale, the Reporter,
were at their heyday. The vested rights theory, of which he was the
principal exponent, was widely accepted, and it was generally believed
that the entire field could be covered by a relatively small number
of simple rules, as that the validity" of a contract is governed by the
law of the place of contracting and that rights and liabilities in tort
Of the Virginia Bar; College of William and Mary B.A. (1948); B.C.,. (1950).
Editor, Insurance Counsel Journal.
1. 2 BEALF, Tim CoNFLicT oF LAws 1928, § 384.1: Annotation, 77 A.L.R.2d 1266
(1961).
2. RE TATEMENT, CONFLICt OF LAWS § 384 ( ).
3. See Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor
Currie, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 463 (1960); Currie, Notes on Methods and Objections in
the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DuKE L. J. 171; Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication
versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. Rav. 205 (1958); Cheatham,
American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HAtv. L. REv.
361 (1945).
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are determined by the law of the place of -injury. Little wonder as a
consequence that the field was deemed ripe for restatement.4
And in commenting on the fact that the rules of the original Restatement
are simple, relatively few in number and dogmatic, he continues:
... They are consistent with the vested rights theory and they give
little indication of the fluidity and of the complexities and uncer-
taincies of the subject.5
The lid was blown off this topic when in 1963 the New York Court
of Appeals rendered its decision in Babcock v. Jackson." There, damages
for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident which oc-
curred in the Province of Ontario, Canada, were sought in a suit
brought in the State of New York by a guest in the automobile against
her host, the driver of the automobile. At the time of the accident there
was in force in Ontario a statute providing that "the owner or driver
of a motor vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the business of
carrying passengers for compensation, is not liable for any loss or
damage resulting from bodily injury to, or the death of any person being
carried in... the motor vehicle" 7 §105, subd. [2]. No such bar is
recognized under New York law and, accordingly, the defendant
moved to dismiss the complaint on the traditional ground that the law
of the place where the accident occurred governs and that Ontario's
Guest Statute barred recovery. The Trial Court agreed with the de-
fendant and granted the motion and this was affirmed by the Appellate
Division over a strong dissent by Mr. Justice Halpern."
On appeal the New York Court of Appeals saw the issue thusly:
The question presented is simply drawn. Shall the law of the place
of the tort invariably govern the availability of relief for the tort or
shall the applicable choice of law rule also reflect a consideration
4. Reese, Conflict of Laws and The Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
679 (1963).
5. Id. at 680.
6. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
An earlier case in the same vein, Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944
(1953), did not receive such notoriety.
7. ONTAR1O RLV. STAT. (1960). c. 172, § 105(2).
8. Babcock v. Jackson, 17 AD.2d 694, 230 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1962). Mr. Justice Hal-
pern's dissent was applauded and the per curiam majority opinion roundly criticized
in Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 Duke L. J. 1, 34-39.
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of other factors which are relevant to the purposes served by the en-
forcement or denial of the remedy.9
The Court recognized lex loci delicti and acknowledged that this rule
had been followed unquestionably in New York until recently. But
the Court noted that in the field of contract law New York had
applied the so-called "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts"
theory of the conflict of laws thereby, in the opinion of the Court,
supplanting the "prior rigid and set contract rules". 10 And Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines" did not go unnoticed, the Court, having observed
that although the "center of gravity" theory was not expressly adopted
in Kilberg there was a weighing of the contacts or interests of the
respective jurisdictions in that case, as a result of which the Massa-
chusetts Death Statute recovery limitation was not applied in a suit
brought in New York for the death of a New York resident in
Massachusetts.'! The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Fuld, then
proceeded to reverse the lower courts, applying the "center of gravity"
or "grouping of contacts" doctrine and concluding on the facts that
the concern of New York was unquestionably the greater and that the
interest of Ontario was *at best minimal:
... The present action involves injuries sustained by a New York
guest as the result of the negligence of a New York host in the
operation of an automobile, garaged, licensed and undoubtedly insured
in New York, in the course of a weekend journey which began and
was to end there. In sharp contrast, Ontario's sole relationship with
the occurrence is the purely adventitious circumstance that the ac-
cident occurred there.1a
In a vigorous dissent Mr. Justice Van Voorhis, joined in by Mr.
Justice Scileppi, observed:
... The present case makes substantial changes in the law of torts.
The expressions 'center of gravity', 'grouping of contacts', and 'signi-
ficant contacts' are catchwords which were not employed to define
9. Babcock v. Jackson, supra, note 6, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746.
10. Id. at 747 citing Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E2d 99 (1954).
11. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 211 N.YS.2d 133, 172 NE.2d 526
(1961).
12. For a similar result see Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 309 F.2d 553 (2nd Cir.
1962), cert. den. 372 US. 912, (1963).
13. Babcock v. Jackson, 240 N.YS.2d 743, 750.
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and inadequate to define a principle of law, and were neither applied
to nor are they applicable in the realm of torts.
... Importing the principles of extraterritoriality into the conflicts of
laws between the States of the United States can only make con-
fusion worse confounded. If extraterritoriality is to be the criterion,
what would happen, for example, in the case of an automobile accident
where some of the passengers came from or were picked up in States
or countries where causes of action against the driver were prohibited,
others where gross negligence needed to be shown, some, perhaps,
from States where contributory negligence and others where com-
parative negligence prevail?
In my view there is no overriding consideration of public policy which
justifies or directs this change in the established rule or renders nec-
essary or advisable the confusion which such a change will introduce.14
Babcock has prompted a considerable amount of scholarly comment.'
One writer rejoiced at Babcock's breaking through "the stifling growth
of Restatement doctrine". 6 Judge Fuld's opinion was observed to be
"notable for the clarity with which it states and meets the issues" and
for being "free from the compromises of court conference that so often
blunt the directness of judicial statement" 17 and the decision was hailed
as being "as heartening as it is historic". 8 One commentator has
14. Id. at 753-754. Mr. Justice Van Voorhis' apprehension as to ensuing "con-
fusion" appears to have been borne out. See Mr. Justice Fuld's dissent in Dym v.
Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463, 209 N.E.2d 792 (1965).
15. See, e.g., Cavers, Cheatham, Currie, Ehrenzweig, Leflar and Reese, Comments
on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development In Conflict of Laws, 63 COL. L.
Rav. 1212 (1963); Reese, Ehrenzweig, Leflar, Cavers, Currie, Neuhaus, De Nova,
Wengler and Nadelman, New Trends In the Conflict of Laws, 28 LAW AND CON-
TEmp. PRoB. 673 (1963); Herzog, Conflict of Laws, 1936 Survey of N. Y. Law, 15
SYRAcas L. Rcv. 169 (1963); Note, 32 FoRDHAM L. REv. 158 (1963); Hyman and
Newhouse, Standards For Preferred Freedoms: Beyond the First, 60 NW. U. L.
REy. 1, 32-34 (1965); Note, 77 HARv. L. Rav. 1463, 1464-65 (1964); Hancock, In the
Parish of St. Mary le Bow, in the Ward of Cheap, 16 STAN. L. REv. 561, 627 (1964).
16. Cavers, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict
of Laws, 63 COL. L. REV. 1212, 1219-20 (1963).
17. Id. Cheatham, at 1229.
18. Id. Currie, at 1233. Professor Currie, it will be recalled, had embraced the
dissent of Mr. Justice Halpern in Babcock (supra, note 6) and in treating Babcock's
precursor, Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953), he speculated
that Grant had completely exposed the absurdity of the original Restatement posi-
tion; see, Currie, Justice Traynor and the Conflict of Laws, 13 STAN. L. REV. 719,
731 (1961).
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characterized the automatic application of lex loci delicti as an attitude
of yesteryear lingering on in some places but, referring to Babcock,
he opined that "so many outstanding courts and judges have recently
risen to meet the challenges of the day that some basic changes in
choice-of-law techniques now seem to be inescapable, and their realiza-
tion merely a question of time"."9
Several authors, notably practicing attorneys, have viewed Babcock
with alarm. One such author believes it will lead to forum shopping2 0
another is of the opinion that it substitutes uncertainty for certainty
in the settlement and trial of multi-state transactions.Y' And it has been
suggested that in Babcock the New York Court was primarily motivated
by its solicitude for an injured New Yorker when it determined that
New York law was applicable.22 One practitioner goes so far as to
acknowledge the death of lex loci delicti and predicts that the tide
cannot be reversed.23
What, then, is the true measure of Babcock?
If a decisions' validity is established by endorsement alone, Babcock
has some impressive credentials. In Pennsylvania, for example, where
only a year previously lex loci delicti had been reaffirmed, the Supreme
Court of that State cast its lot with Babcock with the language:
"We are of the opinion that the strict lex loci delicti rule should be
abandoned in Pennsylvania in favor of a more flexible rule which
permits analysis of the particular issue before the Court." 24
And the Supreme Court of the United States seemingly has lent its
19. Foreword, New Trends in the Conflict of Laws, 28 LAW Am Co Nv . PRoB.
673 (1963).
20. Sparks, Babcock v. Jackson-A Practicing Attorney's Reflections Upon The
Opinion and Its Implications, 31 INS. COUNSEL J. 428 (1964).
21. Kinney, The Interstate Aviation Accident-What Law Governs, 31 INs.
COUNSEL J. 250 (1964). Mr. Kinney suggests that one practical way to cope with
the confusion is to use a balance sheet with regard to the various issues and the
states involved (i.e., residence, domicile, original of trip, wheie ticket purchased,
intended destination, etc.) from which settlement and trial advice is given one's
client.
22. Sparks, supra, note 18, at 435; "The opinion is window dressing." This criti-
cism seems to have been dispelled in Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 262 N.Y.S.2d
463, 209 N-.2d 792 (1965), discussed hereinafter.
23. Lacey, Choice of Law-An Unpredictable But Ineradicable Doctrine, 32 INs.
COUNSEL J. 293, 302 (1965).
24. Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796, 805 (1964).
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support by countenancing the "grouping of contacts" approach in cases
involving the Federal Tort Claims ActF and forum non conveniens
However, even in New York Babcock has not had completely smooth
sailing. In Dym v. GordonP7 a New York passenger brought suit
against a New York host, both of whom were temporarily residing in
Colorado, for injuries sustained during a trip that began and ended in
Colorado. Colorado has a guest statute requiring the showing that the
accident was intentional on the host's part or was caused by the host's
intoxication. A divided New York Court of Appeals concluded that
the Colorado Statute controlled. The majority applied what they con-
ceived to be the Babcock rule but, ironically, Mr. Justice Fuld, the
author of the Babcock opinion, dissented saying:
In the light of this court's decision in Babcock v. Jackson..., I can-
not understand how an affirmance may here be justified. The view
expressed by the majority is inconsistent not only with the rationale
underlying Babcock but with the. rule there explicitly stated, that the
law to be applied to resolve a particular issue in a tort case with
multi-jurisdictional contracts is 'the law of the jurisdiction which,
because of its relationship or contact with the occurence or the parties,
has the greatest concern' with the matter in issue and 'the strongest
interest in its resolution .... 28
The choosing of sides in this debate, supposedly centered on the
adoption of the views expressed in Babcock or the continuation of the
lex loci delicti rule, continues practically on a day to day basis.-
But does the issue resolve itself into the simple rejection or reaffirma-
tion of lex loci delicti? It does not seem so.
It will be recalled that in Babcock the Court buttressed its adoption
of the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" theory with these
words:
25. Richards v. United States, 369 US. 1 (1962).
26. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 US. 612 (1964).
27. Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 262 N.YS.2d 463, 209 N.E.2d 792 (1965).
28. Id. 262 N.Y.S.2d at 470.
29. Recent cases rejecting Babcock are: Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del.
1965); Goranson v. Capital Airlines, 345 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1965); Lyons v. Lyons,
2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965); McDaniel v. Sinn, 194 Kan. 625, 400
P.2d 1018 (1965); See, Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v. Rogers, 398 P.2d 520 (Old. 1965).
Recent cases following Babcock are: Fabricius v. Horgen, 132 N.W.2d 410 (Iowa 1965);
Spector v. West Elizabeth Lumber Co, 37 F.R.D. 539 (W.D. Pa, 1965); Watts v.
Pioneer Corn Co, 342 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wisc. 2d 617, 133
N.W.2d 408 (1965).
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Such, indeed, is the approach adopted in the most recent revision of
the Conflict of Laws Restatement in the field of torts. According to
the principles there set out, 'The local law of the state which has
the most significant relationship with the occurrence and with the
parties determines their rights and liabilities in tort... and the relative
importance of the relationships or contacts of the respective jurisdic-
tions is to be evaluated in the light of 'the issues, the character of the
tort and the relevant purposes of the tort rules involved'....a0
Remember also that those drafting Restatement (Second) have in-
cluded the place of the wrong as one of the most significant contacts
to be considered in determining which law shall apply.3' This doctrine
has been adopted by dictum in Babcock.32
Professor Albert A. Ehrenzweig, continuing his battle against the
Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws" directs his fire specifically
at Restatement (Second) and its proposed rule of "most significant
relationship" (i.e., "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts", these
catchwords being used interchangeably):
Professor Reese (Willis L. M. Reese, Reporter for Restatement
Second) admits that 'until recently the courts with rare unanimity ap-
plied the law of the place of the injury to determine rights and
liabilities in tort', but discounts that practice because 'recently...
several important courts have either expressed dissatisfaction with the
rule or else have reached results that are inconsistent with it.' That fact
might have justified a detailed analysis of results actually reached in
individual fact situations. But it does not justify the American Law
Institute under the pretext of 'restating' existing law to advance a
general proposition which, prior to its tentative announcement, had
never been adopted by any court. A 'restatement' cannot be properly
used to 'aid in inducing the courts to depart from [a presumably
accepted rule-here the place of injury rule] ... in situations where this
is desirable.'
S0. Babcock v. Jackson, 240 N.YS.2d 743.
31. RESTATEm T (SEcowD), CoNmucr o" LAws S 379(2) (Tentative Draft No. 9
11964]).
32. Babcock v. Jackson, 240 N.YS.2d 743, 750-51," . .. Where the defendant's exer-
cise of due care ... is in issue ... it is [usually] appropriate to look to the law of
the place of the tort so as to give effect to that jurisdictions interest in regulating con-
duct within its borders, and it would be almost unthinkable to seek the applicable
rule in the law of some other place."; Note, 32 Fomia> L. Rgv. 158, 161 (1963).
S3. Ehrenzweig, American Conflicts Law in its Historical Perspective: Should the
Restatement be "Continued", 103 U. P,. L. RFy. 133 (1954).
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But the new 'rule' is not only admittedly contrary to prevailing
authority. It is quite apt to be in the way of progress. This may be
shown by the analysis of the first decision by an outstanding court,
which is squarely based on the second Restatement's formula84
Professor Ehrenzweig then proceeds to review Lowe's North Wilkes-
boro Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Mutual Life Insurance Company, 5
decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
There the plaintiff, a North Carolina corporation, in order to qualify
for a business expansion loan sought insurance on the life of its president.
Application was made to defendant, a Pennsylvania insurance com-
pany, for a $200,000 policy. Approximately three weeks later de-
fendant advised plaintiff that only $50,000 could be issued and this was
accepted with the request that defendant consider the matter further.
Plaintiff's president died two days later and suit was brought for
defendant's allegedly negligent delay in acting on the application.
Replying upon the "most significant relationship" approach the Court
concluded that Pennsylvania law was applicable since "the important
events upon which liability, if any, would rest occurred in Penn-
sylvania",36 the state in which "the alleged delay, the foundation of the
cause of action, took place."317 Professor Ehrenzweig concludes that
the Court was misled by the American Law Institute's "new facile
formula" and, in view of the Court's reasoning, he suggests that ".... we
are back to the first Restatement, to that very theory of 'analytical
jurisprudence', of territorialism, and vested rights, which the 'most
significant relationship' formula of the tentative draft of the Restate-
ment Second purports but fails to displace." 2s Thus, even where the
new formula was applied lex loci delicti was the end result. 9
34. Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Torts,
28 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROr. 700, 701-02 (1963).
35. Lowe's North Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc., v. Fidelity Mutual Life Insurance
Company, 319 F.2d 409 (4th Cir. 1963).
36. Id. at 474.
37. Ibid.
38. Ehrenzweig, supra note 31, at 703-04.
39. See, also, Mr. Justice Fuld's dissent in Dym v. Gordon, supra note 25 262 N.Y.S.2d
at 470: ". . . Although the majority in this case reaffirms Babcock's abandonment
of the prior inflexible rule of lex loci delicti, its decision, nevertheless, in essence,
reflects the adoption of an equally mechanical and arbitrary rule that, in litigation
involving a specific relationship, controlling effect must be given to the law of the
jurisdiction in which the relationship originated, notwithstanding that that jurisdiction
may not have the slightest concern with the specific issue raised or that some other
state's relationship or contract with the occurrence or the parties may be such as to
give it the predominant interest in the resolution of that issue"
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Indeed, a careful review of post-Babcock decisions reveals that prag-
matically Babcock has not sounded the death knell of lex loci delicti or,
at lease, paraphasing Mark Twain, the reports of its demise appear to
be greatly exaggerated.40 As shown above, the place of the wrong
will be of prime importance even under the new doctrine. Further,
from a philosophical standpoint the certainty, the stability of lex loci
delicti will continue to attract many courts.4 1 This being so, the Ameri-
can Law Institute's participation in "restating" unsettled law rather than
synthesizing the existing law remains a highly questionable venture,
particularly where, as here, the existing law gives every indication of
remaining with us for quite some time to come.
40. Mark Twain's cable from Europe to the Associated Press; Bartlett, Familiar Quo-
rations (12th Ed. 1948) 616.
41. Friday v. Smoor, supra note 27 211 A.2d at 596-97. See also, Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co. v. Withers, 192 Va. 493, 65 S.E.2d 654 (1951); Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129
S.E.2d 288 (1963).
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